[25] R. Y. Tsai, "A versatile camera calibration technique for high-accuracy 3D machine vision metrology using off-the-shelf TV cameras and lenses." IEEE J. Robot. Automat., vol. RA-3, pp. 323-344, Aug. 1987. [26] C. C. Cheah, S. Kawamora, and S. Arimoto, "Feedback control for robotic manipulators with an uncertain Jacobian matrix," J. Robot Syst., vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 119-134, 1999.
I. INTRODUCTION
As complexity of the modern man-made systems has increased, concerns for safety and reliability have grown. Thus system-theoretic methods on failure diagnosis and fault-tolerant control [2] - [3] have been developed. In [3] , in particular, the quantitative definitions of faults, failures, and fault tolerant systems are proposed in the Ramadge-Wonham framework for control of DES's [1] , and the supervisory control for tolerable fault event sequences are developed under the assumption that we have an exact model of a system. However, in many applications, such model is not available. In [4] , under the assumption of partially unknown DES's, a robust supervisory control to achieve a given desired behavior is introduced. However, the supervisory control technique based on the fault tolerance is missing. In [5] , uncertainty in the transitions of a system is investigated. Such uncertainty results in multiple models of the system that might potentially be correct. The goal of [5] is to specify conditions that enable the identification of the correct model. In [6] , for a given single nominal model, it is shown that there exists a robust supervisor which maximizes the set of models for which a nominal specification is satisfied. However, in this paper, we view uncertainty in modeling as possible dynamics of a system based on the assumption in [4] .
In this paper, we develop a fault-tolerant robust supervisor which guarantees fault-tolerant behavior represented as tolerable fault event sequences of a DES in spite of model uncertainty. In addition, a simple workcell consisting of gas metal arc welding (GMAW) robots, a sensor, and a conveyor is designed and modeled, and the developed theory in this paper is applied to the system.
II. BACKGROUND REVIEW
A brief review of the supervisory control framework for DES's developed by Ramadge and Wonham [1] is given in the following.
The DES to be controlled is modeled by an automaton G = Manuscript received January 8, 1998 ; revised November 20, 1998 . This paper was supported by the Non Directed Research Fund, Korea Research Foundation, 1996. This paper was recommended for publication by Associate Editor M. Zhou and Editor P. B. Luh.
(6; Q; ; q 0 ; Q m ); where 6 is the alphabet of event labels, Q is the set of states, : 62Q ! Q is the transition function (a partial function), q 0 is the initial state, and Q m Q is the set of marked states. We interpret 6 as the set of events. Let 6 3 denote the set of all finite strings of elements of the set 6; including the empty string : The transition function is extended to a (partial) function on 6 3 2 Q by defining (; q) = q and (w; q) = (; (w; q)) whenever q 0 = (w; q) and (; q 0 ) are defined. It is customary to call a subset of 6 3 a language over the alphabet 6: The prefix closure of L 6 3 is defined as L := fu 2 6 3 juv 2 L for some v 2 6 3 g: The closed behavior of G is L(G) := fs 2 6 3 j(s; q 0 ) is definedg which is the set of event sequences generated in the plant. The marked behavior of G is Lm(G) := fs 2 6 3 j(s; q0) 2 Qmg which is the set of event sequences to represent the completed tasks. We partition 6 into controllable and uncontrollable events, i.e., 6 = 6 c _ [ 6 uc : The events in 6c can be disabled, while those in 6uc are always enabled.
Let L 6 3 and 0 2 6 (power set of 6): Then a supervisor S is a map S: L ! 0 which specifies the set of events allowed after a string. Denote the closed loop system of G supervised by S by S=G: The closed behavior of S=G is denoted by L(S=G) [1] .
III. MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND THE CONCEPT OF FAULTS
In [4] , a DES G with model uncertainty is assumed as follows:
Although the system to be controlled is not known exactly, it belongs to a finite set of models, namely G 2 fG 1 ; G 2 ; 111; G n g: This paper follows the above assumption about model uncertainty. Let 6i be the set of events in G i ; and 6 := n i=1 6 i :
Reformulation of the notions of faults, failures, and tolerable fault event sequences defined in [3] is the following: 6 is partitioned as a set of normal events, 6 n ; and a set of abnormal events, 6 an : Normal events occur in the normal operating modes, and abnormal events are unexpected changes in the system such as component faults. So 6 = 6 n _
[ 6 an = 6 c _ [ 6 uc : In general, 6 an 6 uc : Let A(q) be the set of events possible at state q: For t; t 0 2 6 3 ; 2 6; and q 2 Q; let L(q; ) := ftj(t 0 ; q 0 ) = q and t 0 t 2 L(G)g L m (q; ) := ftj(t 0 ; q 0 ) = q and t 0 t 2 L m (G)g where L(q; ) is a set of event sequences generated in the system after occurrence of the event at the state q; and Lm(q; ) is a set of event sequences driven to the marker states after occurrence of the event at the state q: For two languages A; B 6 3 ; AB; i.e., the concatenation of A and B; is defined as follows: AB := fwjw = uv; u 2 A; v 2 Bg: In general, tolerability of systems is a property to perform their tasks against abnormal events. Based on the notion, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Fault):
The aug-event (; q) is a "fault w.r.t. Q m ;" and is called a "fault event" if 2 6an and there exists a nonempty K L m (q; ) such that K6 uc \ L(q; ) K:
The aug-event (; q) is a "failure w.r.t.
Qm;" and is called a "failure event" if 2 6an and (; q) is not a fault.
The equation K6 uc \ L(q; ) K means that K is controllable w.r.t. L(q; ) [1] . These definitions mean that for an abnormal event ; any aug-event (; q) is a fault if it can be driven eventually to a marker state, and is a failure otherwise. A(qi01)0fsig (qi01 := (si01; q0) and s0 := ) for i = 1; 2; 1 11; n is a fault event or a tolerable normal event or belongs to 6 c :
This definition means that T F ES is an event sequence which can drive the initial state to the marker one in spite of the interference of uncontrollable events including the abnormal events.
IV. FAULT-TOLERANT ROBUST SUPERVISORY CONTROL For a DES
Definition 5 (Fault-Tolerant Robust Supervisor): A supervisor S is a "fault-tolerant robust supervisor" for a DES G 2 fG 1 ; 11 1;G n g if there exists a language K i ; K i 6 = ;; for each G i such that Ki T F(Gi) and L(S=Gi) = Ki; where i = 1; 2; 11 1;n:
By the definition, an uncertain DES G controlled by a fault-tolerant robust supervisor generates a nonempty subset of TFES's set for each DES in fG1; 111 ; Gng: For a language L and s 2 L; let A L (s) := f 2 6js 2 Lg: For a string s 2 L(G i ); define the dangerous event set
If an event in Dg L(G ) (s) occurs after generation of the string s in L(Gi); Gi is not guaranteed to drive to marker states. (1)
Dg L(G ) () = ;:
Let s 6 = : Then, as it follows from the analogous procedure in the initial state, the following results (3)- (4) the resolution of complexity burden for our scheme requires the resolution of complexity burden for one model case. The proposed Theorem 1 is not concerned with a specific DES. Thus, it can be applied basically to the fault-tolerant control of any kind of practical DES's with model uncertainty represented as a multiple models set.
V. A WORKCELL OF GAS METAL ARC WELDING (GMAW) ROBOTS: DESIGN, MODELING, AND CONTROL

A. Design
Spot and arc welding using robots are important processes in industries such as ship building and automobile. For a workcell consisting of such welding robots, it may be difficult to obtain its mathematical model due to its complexity. However, it is suited to be modeled in the DES framework. Supervisory control theory based on DES framework provides a systematic method for the analysis and control of such systems. In this paper, in particular, we deal with a case that a sensed result for a kind of the workpiece to be welded may be incorrect due to the similarity or defects of parts and imperfection of a sensor. It results in model uncertainty. Also since a kind of workpiece determines welding conditions, abnormal events may happen due to the unsuitable welding conditions. A synthesized fault-tolerant robust supervisor for the workcell achieves a fault-tolerant behavior of the system with model uncertainty.
In the GMAW process, welding is accomplished by using consumable electrode wire to maintain the electric arc and provide the filler metal. The shielding gas prevents molten material from being oxidized. Before the welding process, welding conditions, largely voltage-current and torch-angle are determined. The welding voltage is a voltage between an electrode wire and a workpiece. The welding current is an electrical conduction in the arc, which is a flow of mixture of free electrons, positive ions, etc.. The torch-angle is an angle between a workpiece and a torch. Given thickness, kind, and joint form of workpieces, welding conditions are determined first. In some cases, the tip of a torch nozzle is choked with the spattered drops of molten material, called weld spatter, which disturbs the shielding gas supply and electrode wire supply. It is called the spattering fault. The primary factor of spattering fault is the unsuitable welding conditions [8] , [9] .
Consider a workcell shown in Fig. 1 , which consists of two GMAW robots, a sensor, a conveyor and a supervisor. Robots are used in the fillet welding. Two robots simultaneously process one part on the conveyor after the sensor operation. All atomic systems are controlled by the supervisor with the observed information of them. Due to the similarity or defects of two parts and imperfection of the sensor, it is assumed that sensed results may be incorrect. Hence, it may sometimes happen that the sensed workpiece as part 1 is really part 2 and vice versa.
B. Modeling
When each robot works, normal welding conditions are shown in Fig. 1 . Let's assume the following. If a robot operates in normal welding conditions, spattering fault does not happen. If a voltage and current condition and a torch-angle condition are all abnormal, clearing weld spatter may be impossible. When part 1 is processed with VA1, AT2 condition may result in failure of clearing weld spatter. When part 1 is processed with VA2, AT1 condition is tolerant of the spattering fault. When part 2 is processed with VA1, AT2 condition is tolerant of the spattering fault. When part 2 is processed with VA2, AT1 condition is tolerant of the spattering fault. The conveyor has one action, i.e., one step movement. The sensor receives a command for operation from the supervisor and sends a message of a sensed result to the supervisor.
Under the assumptions, six atomic systems are modeled by automata. State transition diagrams of them are shown in Fig. 2 (on the transition diagram, the initial state is identified by a thick arrow entering it and marker states by a thick arrow leaving it). The meaning of each event is shown in Table I and events are categorized as follows: 6 c = fVA1; VA2; AT 1; AT 2; mc; swg; 6 uc = 6 0 6 c ; and 6an = fsp1;sp2;fc1;fc2g:
According to the assumption that sensed results may be incorrect, we can develop four models for the system as follows: G1 is a model for the case of correct p1 and p2, G2 is a model for the case of correct p1 and incorrect p2, G 3 is a model for the case of incorrect p1 and correct p2, and G4 is a model for the case of incorrect p1 and p2. In G 2 ; the sensed workpieces as part 1 or part 2 are really part 1. Then the whole system G is modeled as follows: G 2 fG 1 ; G 2 ; G 3 ; G 4 g:
Each Gi is a parallel composed model [7] of atomic models whose the state transition diagram is partially shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
C. Design of a Fault-Tolerant Robust Supervisor
We shall impose a logic-based specification as follows. The conveyor first moves and then the sensor operates. Thereafter, robots perform their works. The above specification is formalized as an automaton SP EC displayed in Fig. 3 .
In Figs T F (G i ) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For example, at the initial state q 0 ; mc 2 K1 and sw; VA1, VA2 = 2 K1 which satisfy SP EC. In G1; let a string s = mc sw p2 VA2 AT 1 and q = (s; q0):
Then A(q) 0 fcp1g = fcp2;sp1;sp2; mc; swg and s cp1 cp2 (2 K1) 2 T F (G1); because (sp1;q) and (sp2;q) are faults, (cp2;q) is tolerable normal, and mc; sw 2 6 c : 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a fault-tolerant robust supervisor of a DES that belongs to a set of models. Also, as an example, design, modeling, and control of a workcell consisting of GMAW robots, a sensor, and a conveyor are described. It is shown that if a language K associated with tolerable fault event sequences satisfies the existence conditions, the faulttolerant robust supervisor assures the fault-tolerant behavior of the uncertain DES.
